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Abstract
Labour markets play a key role in business cycle analysis. Although a focal point of
research on unemployment over the past decade, endogenous job destruction has recently fallen
into disfavour, since its introduction leads to a positively sloped Beveridge curve. We show
that introducing variation in hours per worker - a second margin for labour input adjustment
- in combination with endogenous job destruction generates a negatively sloped Beveridge
curve, a data consistent correlation structure for job flows and captures many aspects of the
cyclical behaviour of hours per worker. This improved peformance is robust to wage rigidity
(which raises the variability of unemployment and labour market tightness) and a wide range
of empirically plausible labour supply elasticities - but not completely inelastic labour supply
implicit in much of the literature on labour market search.
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versity of Birmingham and University of Hull for advice and encouragement. I am responsible for any errors.
Correspondence should be addressed to Richard Holt, Economics, University of Edinburgh, William Robertson
Building, 50 George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JY, Scotland; E-mail: Richard.Holt@ed.ac.uk .
Whither Job Destruction?
Unemployment, Job Flows and Hours in a New Keynesian Model.
1 Introduction.
Unemployment is a fundamental concern for individuals and policy makers. Fluctuations in un-
employment provide a key motivation for business cycle analysis. Despite this many models of
cyclical phenomena do not even consider unemployment or, importantly, frictions associated with
finding employment once unemployed - see, inter alia, Gali (2003), Woodford (2003). The equilib-
rium labour market search framework with matching frictions, expounded in Pissarides (2000), is
a natural framework for thinking about the properties of unemployment and other labour market
variables. Yet research using this approach often avoids an explicit treatment of variation in hours
per worker, which is an important component of overall variation in labour input at business cycle
frequencies, Cho and Cooley (1994). Shimer (2005) highlights a series of anomalies arising in
the canonical equilibrium unemployment model with job destruction associated with capturing
the variability of unemployment and vacancies and the correlation between them.1 Using a New
Keynesian set up to impose the discipline of general equilibrium on our analysis, we show that
introducing a second margin - hours per worker - for labour input adjustment in a model with
labour market search, matching frictions and endogenous job destruction, alters the use of the
extensive margin in response to shocks and makes it possible to capture key properties of the
relationships between unemployment and vacancies, hours and employment and job creation and
job destruction, without distorting the behaviour of other macroeconomic aggregates at business
cycle frequencies. Our results appear robust both to the introduction of varying degrees of wage
rigidity and across a wide range of plausible values of labour supply elasticity.
For much of the last decade, an important strand of the literature has considered how to
endogenise gross job flows in an equilibrium labour market seach framework, Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994, 1999), and examined the consequences of this reformulation of the basic model
for labour market and macroeconomic issues, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Hall (1999), Den
Haan et al. (2000). These developments were a response to extensive empirical evidence on the
1 Shimer (2005) proposes wage rigidity and exogenous job destruction to circumvent these problems.
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(cyclical) properties of US gross job flows summarised in Davis et al. (1996). This highlighted
the greater volatility of job destruction compared to job creation at business cycle frequencies
and the countercyclical behaviour of job destruction. Implicit in these developments is the view
that variation of inflows to unemployment - which depends on job destruction - is critical to the
understanding of unemployment dynamics.
More recent research regards endogenous job destruction as, at best, an unhelpful distraction
in the quest to understand unemployment. Using US data from 2001 Shimer (2005) finds that
cyclical variation in unemployment is driven by outflows, not inflows: he finds that variation in
job destruction is oﬀset by variation in quits. Using an equilibrium labour market search model
Shimer argues that shocks to job destruction produce a positive correlation between unemployment
and vacancies - an upward-sloping Beveridge curve. Krause and Lubik (2006) show that this
phenomenon also arises in a New Keynesian model (without variation in hours per worker).
The implications of Shimer’s study for the role of job destruction have attracted less attention
than his finding that unemployment, vacancies and labour market tightness are insuﬃciently vari-
able in the canonical model. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) attribute this absence of variability to
the fact that vacancies are sensitive to wages, which, under period-by-period Nash bargaining are
too flexible. They propose a revised canonical model of labour market search with matching fric-
tions, wage rigidity and exogenous job destruction. Their proposal has aroused some controversy
in the equilibrium labour maket search literature, see, inter alia, Mortensen and Nagypal (2005).
It has been more readily accepted within the business cycle literature. Using a New Keynesian
framework Krause and Lubik (2006) show that under Nash-bargained wages, marginal cost is no
longer directly related to the current real wage, so that real wage rigidity does not generate in-
creased inflation persistence. Gertler and Trigari (2006) investigate the consequences of staggered
Nash-bargaining of wages in a real business cycle environment.
However, Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006) question the generality of Shimer and
Hall’s empirical evidence. Using US data spanning 1948-2005 they show that job destruction
(and hence inflows to unemployment) are important in determining unemployment during severe
recessions. This raises doubts as to the wisdom of deliberately suppressing endogenous variation
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of job destruction when trying to understand the cyclical properties of labour market variables.
The question we address is whether it is possible to construct plausible labour market behaviour
at business cycle frequencies whilst retaining endogenous job destruction.
Fluctuation in hours per worker accounts for a substantial proportion of the variation in labour
input at business cycle frequencies, Cho and Cooley (1994). Table (2) displays the cyclical be-
haviour of hours employment and total hours for US data over the period 1972-1994 - we use
this period because gross job flows data are publicly available only for this period. The volatility
of hours per worker relative to output is 0.57, and that of employment is 0.68 while the rela-
tive volatility of total hours worked is 1.06. The instantaneous correlation is 0.43, indicating that
hours per worker and output move together at business cycle frequencies. Despite its role in labour
input variation hours per worker is frequently omitted from models with labour market search,
presumably on grounds of parsimony.
We consider a model with labour market search, endogenous job destruction and variable hours.
To show that we are doing more than simply exploiting extra degrees of freedom provided by these
features we demonstrate that the model can account for a broader range of phenomena than the
uenmployment-vacancy relationship considered by Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Krause and Lubik
(2006). We examine the observed variability of unemployment and vacancies, hours, wages and
gross job flows as well as the correlation of hours with employment, vacancies with employment
and of the correlation structure of gross job flows with each other and unemployment. Save for
hours, each element of this diverse set of properties has been considered in at least one paper
above. In one sense this provides a check on the extent to which previous results are robust to
the proposed innovations in model structure, but we go beyond these studies by investigating the
joint behaviour of all these variables simultaneously. To impose modelling discipline we embed the
labour market in a New Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium framework. This diﬀers from the
equilibrium labour market search model used by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005) in allowing a role for consumption smoothing, capital accumulation, monetary
shocks and nominal rigidities. This structure permits us to examine whether any improvement
in labour market performance distorts the behaviour of other macroeconomic aggregates and also
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facilitates comparison with the benchmark alternative of a frictionless Walrasian labour market.2
We show that introducing an intensive margin for the adjustment of labour input, enables the
model to capture the interaction of hours and employment at business cycle frequencies. This is
because the presence of the intensive margin alters the pattern of variation on the extensive mar-
gin(s). With the intensive margin suppressed, a rise in unemployment occurs through a rise in job
creation and an even bigger rise in job destruction. This reflects the relatively low cost of altering
the rate of job destruction (relative to that of job creation). It gives rise to a (counterfactual)
positive correlation of job creation and job destruction. Since job creation tends also to be high
when the number of vacancies open is high, the Beveridge curve also has a positive slope in the
absence of hours variation. Once the intensive margin is introduced, existing firms can use the
intensive rather than the extensive margin to adjust to shocks. This alters both rents available to
existing matches and incentives to destroy existing matches and create new ones, and it attenuates
the use of the extensive margin. So when hours per worker can vary job destruction is less volatile,
and is negatively correlated with both unemployment and job creation. As a result, despite the
presence of endogenous job destruction, hours variation produces a negatively sloped Beveridge
curve.
One potential problem with this approach is that variation on the intensive margin may may
substitute for variation on the extensive margin and attenuate fluctuations in unemployment -
worsening the unemployment - vacancy - tightness volatility puzzle highlighted by Shimer (2005).
This does happen. The variability of unemployment declines, from 60% of that in the data to
33% of that in the data as the intensive margin for labour input is opened up in a baseline New
Keynesian model with endogenous job destruction and flexible wages. Yet in Shimer’s analysis
- which uses a labour market, rather than business cycle model, only 10% of the variability of
US unemployment is captured. So the unemployment volatility problem is less quantitatively
2 This paper uses a New Keynesian framework with labour market frictions. In terms of its focus on the cyclical
behaviour of labour market variables its closest antecedent is that by Krause and Lubik (2005) discussed above.
Trigari (2005) and Walsh (2005) also develop New Keynesian models with labour market search and endogenous
job destruction. Trigari (2005) introduces hours variation. However, like Walsh, her interest is primarily in the
propagation mechanism for inflation and output. These authors demonstrate that this combination of real and
nominal rigidities goes some way to addressing the output and inflation persistence problems observed in early New
Keynesian models. These studies build on the results of Den Haan et al. (2000) who develop a real DGE a model
with endogenous job destruction and demonstrate the role of consumption smoothing and capital accumulation in
the output propagation mechanism.
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significant in our New Keynesian setup than in the canonical equilibrium labour market search
model. In any case, labour market tightness is unaﬀected because the decline in unemployment
variability associated with the introduction of variation in hours per worker is oﬀset by a fall in
the correlation of unemployment with vacancies and a rise in the variability of vacancies.
In the light of the interest in the literature in wage rigidity as a solution to the unemployment
volatility puzzle, Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Krause and Lubik (2006), we examine whether our
results are robust to and/or improved upon by wage rigidity. We confirm that with or without wage
rigidity, the introduction of variation in hours per worker renders both the correlations between
unemployment and vacancies and between job creation and job destruction negative. However,
wage rigidity improves the ability of the model to capture the magnitudes of these statistics, as
well as the variability of unemployment, vacancies, tightness and wages. Next, since a wide range
of estimates of the elasticity of labour supply are available in the microeconometric literature,
see Blundell and McCurdy (1999), Domeij and Floden (2005), we demonstrate that the eﬀects of
introducing variation in hours results are robust across a wide range of labour supply elasticities
- but that a positively sloped Beveridge curve and job flows correlation arise when labour supply
is very inelastic, as in Shimer (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2006).
The model is outlined in Section 2. Calibration and solution method are discussed in Section
3. Section 4 presents and discusses the results and assess the contribution of various features in
accounting for US business cycles facts. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
To study the interaction of cyclical variation in hours per worker and employment decisions
(through variation in job creation and job destruction), and examine the robustness of results
to wage rigidity, we embed the treatment of labour market search frictions in a New Keynesian
framework, (we call this modelNKS). Besides providing modelling discipline this allows us to con-
trast model performance under labour market frictions model with that under frictionless labour
markets as in the canonical New Keynesian model, (hereafter NK).
There are 4 types of agent in the NKS economy: intermediate good producers, final goods
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producers, households and a government. Production of the intermediate good requires capital and
labour input. Labour input can be varied on both extensive and intensive margins. The strength
of variation on the intensive margin can be ’controlled’ by altering the elasticity of labour supply
(preferences over leisure). Frictions in the formation of new matches are captured by an aggregate
matching function - where the probability of a firm filling a vacancy, and the probability of an
unemployed worker finding a job depend on the relative numbers of these two types. The number
of vacancies is determined by a free entry condition - which drives the expected value of opening
a new vacancy to zero. The number of vacancies is sensitive to wages. In the NKS model we
assume wages are determined by Nash Bargaining each period. In later sections we introduce the
possibility that wages display ’rigidity’. The flow into unemployment arises through destruction
of existing matches. This rate is determined endogenously.
Otherwise the NKS economy is as a standard New Keynesian economy. Households derive
utility from leisure, final goods consumption and holding (real) money balances. They may supply
hours of work to intermediate good producers. They can save by accumulating capital which they
rent to intermediate good producers and they purchase a basket of final goods from final good
producers. Final good producers are monopolistically competitive. They each costlessly produce
a diﬀerentiated final good by using only the homogeneous intermediate good and set the price
of their product intermittently according to a Calvo price adjustment rule. Intermediate good
producers are price takers in product and factor markets. The government issues money, collects
seigniorage revenues and rebates these to households. It undertakes no other function.
With this basic structure in mind we discuss in turn the specification of goods and labour
markets, the decision problem of households, our assumptions about the actions of the government
and finally the equilibrium characterisation of the economy.
2.1 Goods and Labour Markets
2.1.1 The Intermediate sector
Production Production of intermediate goods takes place in matched firm-worker pairs - or,
for notational ease, matches. Each match consists of one worker and one firm, who together
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engage in production until the employment relationship is terminated. By assumption, both firms
and workers are restricted to a single employment relationship at any given time. Matches are
subject to aggregate productivity and idiosyncratic cost shocks, Zt and Xt respectively, each with
unit mean. Following Den Haan et al. (2000), Trigari (2006), assume that idiosyncratic cost
disturbances are serially uncorrelated. Date t production occurs after realisation of the date t
shocks. A match facing a high realisation of X at date t, greater than some threshold value X¯t,
may decide to terminate the matching relationship - see below. At date t an ongoing match - facing
idiosyncratic shock Xt < X¯t can combine capital, K˘ (Xt) and hours of labour input, H (Xt), to
produce
Y I (Xt) = AZtK˘ (Xt)
αH (Xt)
1−α
+ F −Xt
units of intermediate good.3 The parameter α represents the elasticity of match output with
respect to capital input and A and F are positive constants. Matches are price takers and sell
their homogeneous intermediate output at (nominal) price P It . The formal separation of the job-
destruction and price-setting decision problems is maintained for tractability, but is consistent
with the view that prices are not set at the level of an individual match.
Suppose that the match specific capital stock, K˘ (Xt) is chosen to maximise current profits of
the match:
max
K˘
(
AZtK˘ (Xt)
αH (Xt)
1−α + F −Xt
µt
− R
K
t K˘ (Xt)
Pt
− W (Xt)H (Xt)
Pt
)
.
where µt =
Pt
P It
is the markup of the index of final goods prices over the price of the intermediate
good (the reciprocal of marginal cost), RKt is the (nominal) rental rate on capital (user cost of
capital), W (Xt) is the match specific (nominal) wage. The first order condition for this problem
is
K˘ (Xt) =
∙
αAZt
µtR
K
t /Pt
¸ 1
1−α
H (Xt) (1)
The optimal choice of capital-hours ratio K˘(Xt)H(Xt) depends only on aggregate conditions, and is
decreasing in the markup and the real return on capital and increasing in aggregate productivity.
3 An additive idiosyncratic shock avoids wide variation of hours across matches, Cooley and Quadrini (1999).
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Using (1) current profits are
ΠI (Xt) ≡ (1− α)
∙
AZt
µt
¸ 1
1−α
∙
α
RKt /Pt
¸ α
1−α
H (Xt) +
F −Xt
µt
− W (Xt)H (Xt)
Pt
(2)
Value Functions Next we describe the value functions for firms’ and workers’ decision problems.
Let ht = {h0, ..., ht}, denote the history of events up to date t, where ht is the event realisation
at date t. The date 0 probability of observing ht is given by dt. The initial state h0 is given
so that d
¡
h0
¢
= 1. Henceforth, in order to simplify the notation, define the operator Et [·] ≡P
ht+1
d
¡
ht+1|ht¢ as the mathematical expectation over all possible states of nature conditional
on ht.
In equation (3) V Ut , the date t value of unemployment, expressed in final goods, comprises the
consumption value of utility from search, the discounted present value of ongoing unemployment
next period, V Ut+1, and the diﬀerence between the value of employment, V
W (X), and that of
unemployment in the event that the worker matches this period (with probability κUt ) and the
match survives to produce next period (with probability (1− ρx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢
):
V Ut =
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ
1
Λt
+ βEt
"
Λt+1
Λt
"
V Ut+1 + κ
U
t (1− ρx)
Z X¯t+1 £
VW (X)− V Ut+1
¤
dF (X)
##
. (3)
Matching and production occur simultaneously, so that a match which is formed in period t cannot
produce until period t+1, after aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks have been realised. As a result
a new match survives with probability (1− ρx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢
.
Let VW (Xt) denote the date t value, expressed in terms of consumption goods, to a worker of
employment in an ongoing match with idiosyncratic cost shock Xt.
VW (Xt) =
W (Xt)H (Xt)
Pt
+ κH
(1−H (Xt))1−ϕ
1− ϕ
1
Λt
+βEt
"
Λt+1
Λt
"
V Ut+1 + (1− ρx)
Z X¯t+1 £
VW (X)− V Ut+1
¤
dF (X)
##
. (4)
The worker supplies H (Xt) hours of labour to the firm for real hourly wage
W (Xt)
Pt
. Both wage
and hours are outcomes of a bargaining process - see below. Hours worked generates income, but
hours spent in the workplace reduce utility. These concerns are captured in the first two terms
in (4). The remainder of the date t value to an employed worker from the ongoing match is the
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discounted present value, βEt
h
Λt+1
Λt
V Ut+1
i
, of unemployment (where Λt is the marginal utility of
consumption in date t) plus the diﬀerence between the value of employment, VW (X), and that
of unemployment in the event that the match continues to produce next period (where we sum
across values of X which do not lead to termination prior to date t+ 1 production).
The date t value, V J (Xt), of a firm that forms part of an ongoing match with current match
specific shock Xt, consists of current profits plus the appropriately discounted value to the firm of
the sum of a date t+ 1 vacancy, V Vt+1, in the event that the match terminates prior to production
in period t+ 1 (where termination occurs with probability ρt+1 = ρ
x + (1− ρx)
¡
1− F
¡
X¯t+1
¢¢
)
and the expected value in the event that the match continues to produce in t+ 1;
V J (Xt) = Π
I (Xt) + βEt
"
Λt+1
Λt
"
ρt+1V
V
t+1 + (1− ρx)
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
##
.
We assume vacancy posting costs κ per period. Then the value in date t of a firm with an unfilled
vacancy, V Vt , reflects the cost of posting that vacancy plus the value of firm, V
V
t+1, in the event
that the firm fails to fill the vacancy by date t+ 1 or else the event that the vacancy is filled but
the match is terminated prior to production in period t+ 1 (this occurs for a suﬃciently adverse
realisation of the idiosyncratic shock), plus the value V J (X) in the event that the vacancy is filled
and the period t+ 1 idiosyncratic cost shock takes a value X, that does not lead to termination
V Vt = −κ+ βEt
"
Λt+1
Λt
"¡
1− κVt (1− ρx)F
¡
X¯t+1
¢¢
V Vt+1 + κ
V
t (1− ρx)
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
##
.
The free entry condition on vacancies drives the value of a vacancy to zero, V Vt = 0, ∀t, so the
Bellman equations for V J (Xt), and V Vt become
V J (Xt) = ΠI (Xt) + (1− ρx)βEt
"
Λt+1
Λt
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
#
(5)
κ = κVt (1− ρx)βEt
"
Λt+1
Λt
Z X¯t+1
V J (X) dF (X)
#
. (6)
Moreover, using (5), we can re-write (6) as a Bellman equation for κVt :
κ
κVt
= β (1− ρx)Et
"
Λt+1
Λt
Z X¯t+1 ∙
ΠI (X) +
κ
κVt+1
¸
dF (X)
#
. (7)
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Bargaining: Hours and Wages As in the canonical equilibrium unemployment model, Morte-
nesen and Pissarides (1999), we assume that for each match engaged in production, the firm and
worker adopt Nash bargaining over hours worked and the hourly wage. We discuss how to model
wage rigidity in Section (4.2). The division of the match surplus,
S (Xt) = VW (Xt)− V Ut + V J (Xt)− V Vt = VW (Xt)− V Ut + V J (Xt) , (8)
is determined on a period by period basis as:
max
W (Xt),H(Xt)
£
VW (Xt)− V Ut
¤η £
V J (Xt)− V Vt+1
¤1−η
.
The first order conditions for hours and wages respectively are
ηV J (Xt)
"
W (Xt)
Pt
− κH
(1−H (Xt))−ϕ
Λt
#
= −
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− η)
¡
VW (Xt)− V Ut
¢ ·
∙
(1− α)
h
AZt
µt
i 1
1−α
h
α
RKt /Pt
i α
1−α − W (Xt)Pt
¸
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
,
(9)
ηV J (Xt) = (1− η)
¡
VW (Xt)− V Ut
¢
. (10)
Optimal hours worked are thus
κH
(1−H (Xt))−ϕ
Λt
= κH
(1−Ht)−ϕ
Λt
= (1− α)
∙
AZt
µt
¸ 1
1−α
∙
α
RKt /Pt
¸ α
1−α
∀Xt ≤ X¯t. (11)
Equation (11) says that, under Nash bargaining, the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and hours worked is equal to the marginal product of labour. Hours per worker in
ongoing matches are decreasing in the rental rate on capital, and the markup, but increasing in
aggregate productivity. Variation in hours per worker is decreasing in ϕ, so choice of ψ can be
used to shut down the intensive margin in our experiments. Hours per worker are independent of
the match specific shock: H (Xt) = Ht. From (1) capital is also independent of the match specific
shock: K˘ (Xt) = K˘t.Note also that this outcome is eﬃcient.
Using equations (3) and (4) we write
VW (Xt)− V Ut =
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+ κH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
− (1−e)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
+
¡
1− κUt
¢
β (1− ρx)Et
h
Λt+1
Λt
R X¯t+1 £VW (X)− V Ut+1¤ dF (X)i .
Using (10) and (6) it follows that
VW (Xt)− V Ut =
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+ κH
(1−Ht)1−ϕ
1− ϕ
1
Λt
− (1− e)
1−ϕ
1− ϕ
1
Λt
+
η
1− η
¡
1− κUt
¢ κ
κVt
.
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Lastly, combining (5) and (6)
V J (Xt) = (1− α)
∙
AZt
µt
¸ 1
1−α
∙
α
RKt /Pt
¸ α
1−α
Ht +
F −Xt
µt
− W (Xt)Ht
Pt
+
κ
κVt
.
So the optimal wage for a match with idiosyncratic cost realisation Xt becomes
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
=
η
∙
(1− α)
h
AZt
µt
i 1
1−α
h
α
RKt /Pt
i α
1−α
Ht + F−Xtµt + κ
κUt
κVt
¸
+(1− η)
h
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
− κH (1−Ht)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
i
.
Define aggregate labour income as WtHtPt = Ht
R X¯t W (Xt)
Pt
dF (X). Then
WtHt
Pt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
η
∙
(1− α)
h
AZt
µt
i 1
1−α
h
α
RKt /Pt
i α
1−α
Ht + 1µt
∙
F −
U X¯t X dF (X)
F(X¯t)
¸
+ κκ
U
t
κVt
¸
+(1− η)
h
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
− κH (1−Ht)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
i
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
F
¡
X¯t
¢
.
(12)
The first term within the first square brackets on the right hand side of equation (12) represents
the workers’ share of the market value of production, the second term reflects the market value
of idiosyncratic costs (relative to steady state), and the third term reflects the impact of labour
market tightness. The remaining term reflects the worker’s reservation wage.
Separation For values of the idiosyncratic cost shock above a certain threshold level, X¯t, sep-
aration occurs. The condition S
¡
X¯t
¢
= 0, pins down this threshold value of the match specific
shock. Combining (8) and (10), V J (Xt) = (1− η)S (Xt). So X¯t is determined by the condition
V J
¡
X¯t
¢
= 0 :
(1− α)
∙
AZt
µt
¸ 1
1−α
∙
α
RKt /Pt
¸ α
1−α
Ht +
F − X¯t
µt
−
W
¡
X¯t
¢
Ht
Pt
+
κ
κVt
= 0.
This equation indicates that a job is destroyed when costs are suﬃciently high that the value
of production net of idiosyncratic cost shock and wage equals the (expected) cost of posting a
vacancy. Substituting for the match specific wage, the threshold value X¯t is determined by
(1− η)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(1− α)
h
AZt
µt
i 1
1−α
h
α
RKt /Pt
i α
1−α
Ht + F−X¯tµt
−
h
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
− κH (1−Ht)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
i
⎤
⎥⎥⎦− ηκ
κUt
κVt
+
κ
κVt
= 0. (13)
2.1.2 Labour Market Flows
The match specific production, bargaining and separation decisions described above depend on
the probability that unemployed workers find jobs and the probability that vacancies are filled.
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Here we discuss these probabilities and the associated labour market flows.
Define the number of matches at the beginning of period t as Nt ∈ [0, 1]. We allow some
job destruction in the form of quits which are taken as exogenous and independent of the match-
specific productivity. We capture this by allowing a fraction, ρx, of matches to separate prior to the
realisation of period t (productivity) shocks. Subsequently, idiosyncratic productivity disturbances
are realised, and a match may choose to break up if the value of the match surplus is negative.
Endogenous separation thus occurs with probability ρn
¡
X¯t
¢
= 1 −
R X¯t dF (X), where dF (·) is
the probability density function over X. The overall separation rate in period t is
ρt = ρ
x + (1− ρx)
¡
1− F
¡
X¯t
¢¢
. (14)
Next consider the matching frictions. We model this rigidity using an aggregate matching
function. Matching occurs at the same time as production. We assume, following Pissarides
(2000), that there is a continuum of potential firms, with infinite mass, and a continuum of
workers of unit mass. Unmatched firms choose whether or not to post a vacancy and incur a cost
κ per period. Free entry of unmatched firms determines the size of the vacancy pool. Define the
mass of firms posting vacancies in period t as Vt. Let the mass of searchers, unmatched workers,
be Ut. All unmatched workers may enter the matching market in period t - even if their match
dissolved at the start of period t, so
Ut = 1− (1− ρt)Nt. (15)
New matches in date t begin production in date t + 1, while unmatched workers remain in the
worker matching pool. The flow of successful matches created in period t is given by the constant
returns matching function
Mt =M (e · Ut)γ V 1−γt . (16)
where γ, e ∈ (0, 1) and M > 0. The parameter e represents the eﬃciency with which unemployed
workers engage in search. The number of employed workers at the start of period t+ 1 is
Nt+1 = (1− ρt)Nt +Mt. (17)
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Denote the probability that a vacancy is filled in date t as
κVt =
Mt
Vt
, (18)
and the probability that an unemployed worker enters employment in period t as
κUt =
Mt
Ut
. (19)
Gross job destruction is the employment relationships that separate less exogenous separations
that rematch within period
JDt =
ρtNt − κVt ρxNt
Nt
= ρt − κVt ρx. (20)
Gross job creation is the flow of new matches (as a fraction of existing employment) less matches
due to firms filling vacancies that resulted from exogenous separations
JCt =
Mt − κVt ρxNt
Nt
=
Mt
Nt
− κVt ρx. (21)
2.1.3 Final Goods Sector
Assume that there is a continuum of final goods producers, with unit mass. Final good firm z
acquires the wholesale good at price P It and costlessly transforms it into the divisible final good z
which is then sold directly to households at price pt (z). Define Pt =
³R 1
0
pt (z)
1−ε dz
´ 1
1−ε
as the
utility based price index associated with both the investment and consumption composites. The
market for final goods is characterised by monopolistic competition - ε represents the elasticity of
substitution across varieties of final good. Aggregate demand for the final good z in period t is
yt (z) = ct (z) + it (z) ,
where ct (z) represents consumption demand for final good z output and it (z) represents gross
investment demand for final good z output. The optimal choices of consumption and investment
expenditures on final good z are then
ct (z) =
µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶−ε
Ct, it (z) =
µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶−ε
It,
where aggregate consumption, Ct =
³R 1
0
ct (z)
ε−1
ε dz
´ ε
1−ε
, aggregate investment, It =
³R 1
0
it (z)
ε−1
ε dz
´ ε
1−ε
and aggregate final good output Yt =
³R 1
0
yt (z)
ε−1
ε dz
´ ε
1−ε
are composite indices of final goods.
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Suppose that final goods prices exhibit nominal rigidities which follow a Calvo style adjustment
scheme. Assume that with probability (1− ω) a final good producer can set the price of its output
in period t. Let this probability be independent of when the firm last adjusted price. Then the
average price for final goods producers who do not adjust their price is simply Pt−1. Suppose that
the average price set by firms who do adjust price is p¯t.
Since pure forward looking price adjustment schemes seem not to account adequately for ob-
served inflation dynamics, and to facilitate comparability with other studies, we employ a hybrid
scheme (following Gali and Gertler (1999)). Assume that a fraction (1− τ) of the final goods
producers are forward looking and set prices optimally (to maximise expected discounted profits
given the probability of future adjustment).4 Define the price set by forward looking producer z
at date t as pt (z). Since all forward looking firms setting price at date t face the same expected
future demand and cost conditions they choose the same price, so pt (z) = p∗t , where
p∗t =
ε
1− ε
Et
P∞
s=0 ω
sβs Λt+sΛt
³
p∗t
Pt+s
´1−ε
Yt+sP It+s
Et
P∞
s=0 ω
sβs Λt+sΛt
³
p∗t
Pt+s
´1−ε
Yt+s
(22)
The remaining fraction τ of firms setting price in period t are assumed to set prices equal to the
average of the last period reset prices, corrected for inflation, πt−1:
pbt = p¯t−1πt−1. (23)
The average price set in period t is pt =
h
(1− τ) (p∗t )
1−ε
+ τ
¡
pbt−1
¢1−εi 11−ε
, and the aggregate
retail price index evolves according to
P 1−εt = (1− ω) (p¯t)
1−ε
+ ωP 1−εt−1 . (24)
2.2 Households
Assume that the economy contains a continuum of households of unit mass. Households own all
retail and wholesale firms. They can save by accumulating capital - which they rent to wholesale
firms - by holding (nominal) contingent claims, or non-interest bearing money balances. To avoid
the distributional issues that arise because some workers are unmatched, we assume that complete
asset markets allow workers to insure themselves against (cross-section) variation in the marginal
4 This structure is used by Trigari (2003), Walsh (2005) uses Christiano et al. (2005) approach.
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utility of consumption. Under this simplifying assumption, household behaviour can be analysed in
terms of a representative consumer.5 Assume that the representative consumer derives utility from
consumption, leisure, and services provided by holding real money balances; that the instantaneous
utility function exhibits habit persistence in consumption.6 Let the household chooses consumption
and money balances to maximise expected utility over her lifetime
Eτ
"X
t=0
βt
"¡
Cht − κCCht−1
¢1−φ
1− φ +
κM
P
1− ξ
µ
Mht
Pt
¶1−ξ
+ Ut
(1− e)1−ϕ
1− ϕ − (1− Ut)
κH
1− ϕ (1−Ht)
1−ϕ
##
.
Here β, the discount factor, κC , the strength of the habit, κM
P
, the relative weight on money
balances in the utility function, κH , the relative weight on leisure in the utility function, φ, the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ϕ, the elasticity of substitution of hours
per worker and ξ are all positive constants. Variables superscripted h are elements of the house-
hold decision problem. When employed, hours of work are determined through bargaining (with
wholesale firms) rather than being unilaterally determined by the individual household.
The representative consumer maximises expected lifetime utility subject to the following se-
quence of constraints
PtCht + PtI
h
t +Et
©
vt,t+1Dht+1
ª
+Mht = R
K
t K
h
t + Iht +Dht +Mht−1 + PtTht ,
Kht+1 = (1− δ)Kht + Iht +
χ
2
¡
Iht − δKht
¢2
Kht
, t ≥ 0.(25)
HereDht+1 represents nominal payoﬀ in period t+1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t, vt,t+1,
is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead nominal payoﬀs relevant to the representative
household. Mht represents holdings of nominal money balances at the end of period t, PtT
h
t
represents a lump-sum nominal transfer from households due to rebated seigniorage revenues. Cht
and Iht are household consumption expenditures and gross fixed capital formation expenditures
respectively, Kht+1 represents capital stock carried held at the end of period t. The positive
constants δ and χ capture (geometric) capital depreciation and the magnitude of (quadratic)
adjustment costs (on net investment).7 RKt is the rental return on capital. Iht is the household’s
nominal income (labour income, plus firms’ profits net of expenditures on vacancies).
5 This sort of assumption is a common simplification in the literature on business cycle fluctuations under labour
market search designed to facilitate tractability, see e.g. Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995).
6 Although evidence is not entirely supportive of the presence of habit persistence in consumption, Attanasio
(1999), Dynan (2000), it has been widely adopted in New Keynesian models of the business cycle to augment the
propagation mechanism. We adopt it here primarily to facilitate comparison of the results with that literature.
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The solution to the representative consumer’s problem is characterised by first-order conditions
for bond holdings, Dht , consumption C
h
t , money balances M
h
t , investment I
h
t and capital stock
Kht+1. Define the gross return on a riskless asset paying oﬀ one unit of currency in date t+ 1 as
Rnt =
1
Et[vt,t+1]
, where Et [vt,t+1] is the price of that asset, and the date t shadow value of capital
at date t+ 1 as Qt. The resulting first order conditions can be written as:
1 = βRnt Et
∙
Pt
Pt+1
Λt+1
Λt
¸
. (26)
Λt =
¡
Cht − κCCht−1
¢−φ
+ βEt
h¡
Cht+1 − κCCht
¢−φi
. (27)
κM
P
µ
Mht
Pt
¶−ξ
− Λt = βEt
∙
Λt+1
Pt+1
Pt
¸
(28)
Λt = Qt
∙
1 + χ
Iht − δKht
Kht
¸
(29)
Qt = βEt
"
Λt+1
RKt+1
Pt+1
+Qt+1
"
1− δ − χ
2
"µ
Iht+1
Kht+1
¶2
− δ2
###
(30)
2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Exogenous Driving Processes
We set government spending to zero and assume that the government maintains a balanced budget
by rebating seigniorage revenues to households in the form of lump-sum transfers. The government
budget constraint is thus PtTt = Mt −Mt−1,where Mt is the aggregate money stock. Monetary
policy is specifed by
Mt =Mt−1e
υt (31)
where υt evolve according to the AR(1) process
υt = ρυυt−1 + ευ,t. (32)
Costs of capital adjustment are associated with aggregate net investment, while capital can be costlessly re-
allocated across intermediate producers. To generate hump-shaped investment response, Christiano et al. (2005)
assume that adjustment costs penalise changes in the rate of change of investment. Since microeconometric evidence
does not appear to support this specification, Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), Bond and Van Reenen (2003).
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The logarithm of aggregate productivity also follows an AR(1) process:
lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + εZ,t (33)
where εν,t and εZ,t are independent mean zero processes.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the rental market for capital requires that Kt = (1− ρx)Nt
R X¯t
0
K˘tdF (X) =
(1− ρx)F
¡
X¯t
¢
NtK˘t. Using (1) gives
Kt = (1− ρx)F
¡
X¯t
¢
Nt
∙
αAZt
µtR
K
t /Pt
¸ 1
1−α
Ht. (34)
Under the representative consumer framework, household choices (superscript h) are common
across households. There is a unit mass of households, so in equilibrium Mht =Mt etc, in (25) to
(30).
Now aggregate income, It comprises labour income, plus profits of final goods producers, plus
profits of intermediate goods producers net of vacancy posting costs It = (1− ρx)NtWtHt +
PtΠFt + PtΠ
I
t . Here, nominal final goods profits are PtΠ
F
t =
R
pt (z) yt (z) dz − P It
R
yt (z) dz =
PtYt − P It Y It , and
Y It = (1− ρx)Nt
Z X¯t
0
h
AZtK˘αt H
1−α
t + F −X
i
dF (X)− κµtVt (35)
denotes aggregate intermediate output net of vacancy posting costs.8 Nominal intermediate good
producers’ profit can be written as the sum of output net of vacancy costs, less aggregate wage pay-
ments and capital rental payments: PtΠIt = P
I
t Y
I
t −(1− ρx)NtWtHt−RKt (1− ρx)Nt
R X¯t
0
K˘tdF (X).
Using these insights and cancelling terms gives
It = PtYt −RKt Kt
In equilibrium, the household budget constraint reduces to the aggregate (final) goods market
equilibrium condition
Yt = Ct + It (36)
8 Note Y It =
U 1
0 yt (z) dz. Using the demand function for final good z: yt (z) =

pt(z)
Pt
−ε
Yt, we have Y It =
U 1
0

pt(z)
Pt
−ε
Ytdz =

Pt
P˜t
ε
Yt, where P˜t =
U 1
0 pt (z)
−ε dz, is an auxilliary price index.
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Thus the system of equations governing equilibrium in the economy consists of the numbered
equations (2), (7) and (11) - (36).
3 Calibration & Model Solution Method
We log-linearise the model about its (zero-inflation, zero growth) steady state and use impulse
response analysis and dynamic simulations to tease out the dynamic structure of the economy.
Model solution requires choice of several parameters governing steady state values of labour and
goods market variables; nominal rigidity, and household preferences. We also specify the processes
governing idiosyncratic productivity and money supply growth. These parameters are chosen to
match properties of the US economy over the sample period. The parameter values are summarised
in Table 1, Appendix A contains discussion of the rationale for and origins of these choices.
Table (1) here.
4 Results
4.1 Qualitative Response to Monetary and Productivity Shocks
To enhance our understanding of the mechanisms at work in theNKS economy and the behaviour
of the general equilibrium system, we study the impulse responses to monetary and productivity
shocks under the baseline calibration. These are illustrated in Figure (1).
Figure (1) here.
Panels (a) - (e) show the NKS response to a 1% monetary growth innovation. First consider the
behaviour of expenditures. With nominal rigidity in price-setting, output, consumption and invest-
ment increase in response to a monetary innovation - panel (a). Habit persistence penalises rapid
changes in consumption and leads to a hump-shaped response in consumption, whereas the output
and investment responses are front-loaded. This reflects the absence of microeconometric evidence
supporting a habits based approach to investment. Long-run neutrality of money guarantees that
steady state capital stock is unaﬀected by the monetary shock, and, despite ongoing depreciation,
the sharp initial rise in investment is followed, after 6 quarters, by a period of disinvestment. With
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nominal rigidities in price setting, a money growth expansion raises marginal cost (reduces the
markup) and inflation. Although this markup eﬀect is frontloaded, the backward-looking element
in price-setting leads to a hump-shaped inflation response - panels (d) and (e).
Next consider labour market variables. In the absence of changes to exogenous productivity,
the increase in production is associated with a rise in both employment and hours (as well as
capital accumulation) panel (d) and (e). Increased employment is achieved through action on both
extensive margins with a sharp rise in job creation and a sharp decline in job destruction - panel
(c). The rise in job creation is accompanied by an increase in vacancy posting and triggered by high
rents which accrue to existing matches and arise because matching frictions prevent instantaneous
adjustment to innovations. The decline in unemployment and rise in vacancies raises labour market
tightness and makes it relatively diﬃcult to fill vacancies; so both vacancies and job creation
rebound after their initial increases - panels (b) and (c). This subsequent lack of new job creation,
combines with a near steady-state job-destruction rate to eliminate the initial rise in employment
(after about 6 quarters) and leads to above steady-state unemployment for the remainder of the
transient response. The rise in hours per worker and the increase in labour market tightness lead
(through equation (12)), to a front-loaded rise in the real wage - panel (d).
Panels (f) - (j) of Figure (1) show the NKS response to a 1% productivity shock. Output,
investment (after a brief decline) and consumption display a persistent hump-shaped response,
with investment displaying the largest percentage deviation - panel (f). With nominal rigidities
in price setting, the productivity shock generates a rise in the markup (decline in marginal cost) -
panel (i) and disinflation - panel (j) - which is hump-shaped due to backward looking price setting
behaviour. Since money is neutral in the long-run, cumulative inflation is zero.
There is a front-loaded decline in the real wage - panel (i). This is associated with an immediate
decline in hours worked and initial decline in employment (and fall in labour market tightness)
- panel (i). These features are consistent with Gali’s (1999) account of the impact of technology
shocks under nominal rigidities. Since hours worked returns to steady state while capital and
productivity are higher than in steady state, real wage rises above steady state for a period. The
initial decline in employment below steady state is more than reversed after 4 quarters as new
19
Whither Job Destruction?
Unemployment, Job Flows and Hours in a New Keynesian Model.
matches continue to be formed to take advantage of temporarily high productivity and capital
stock. A period of above steady state employment ensues, as existing matches continue to enjoy
high levels of capital stock and aggregate productivity levels. In the immediate aftermath of the
productivity shock, inauspicious employment prospects lead to a decline in vacancies - consistent
with a decline in job creation. However, the initial rise in unemployment reduces labour market
tightness and makes it relatively easy for firms to fill vacancies; so vacancies and job creation
rebound after their initial declines to several percentage points above steady state panels (g) and
(h). This ongoing job creation, combined with a rate of job-destruction that subsequently remains
near the steady state level eliminates the initial unemployment (after about 4 quarters) allowing
below steady state unemployment for the remainder of the transient response.
In summary, adjustment to shocks involves variation of hours and unemployment. The latter
arises through variation in both job creation and job destruction. The balance of these reflect the
relative costs of adjustment at each margin, we explore this issue in more detail below.
4.2 Business Cycle Moments
How do labour market frictions aﬀect relative volatilities of labour market variables and other
macroeconomic aggregates? What is the eﬀect of (1) suppressing variation in hours worked and (2)
imposing real wage rigidity on the slope of the Beveridge curve, the contemporaneous correlation
of hours with employment, and job creation with job destruction? Evidence on these issues is
collected in Table (2).
Column (2) of Table (2) records US Data, Data, corresponding to the sample period (1972:2-
1993:4).9 Every other column of Table (2) corresponds to a particular model variant.10 These
variants are chosen to illustrate the limit behaviour of the baseline model approximating to partic-
ular features that are common in the literature. Column (3), NKS, reports results for the baseline
calibration. Column (4), NK, is a standard New Keynesian model with a frictionless Walrasian
9 The length of this sample period is dictated by the availability of the job flows series.
10All statistics (for model simulations and data) are computed from Hodrick Prescott detrended data, expressed
as percentage deviations from steady state (or trend in the case of the data). The business cycle statistics are
computed by averaging across 200 simulations. In conducting the simulations of NKS, the standard deviation of
productivity shocks in the baseline model outlined in Section (2) is set to 1.1% in order to match the variability of
(HP-detrended) quarterly GDP in US data, which is 1.61% over the sample period (1972:2 - 1993:4). This value
of σZ is used in all model variants, in order to be able to compare the relative strength of the amplitude and
propagation mechanisms in each variant.
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labour market.11 This model omits parameters ρ, N , κV , ρx, σX , γ and η , relating to search,
bargaining and separation, but is otherwise calibrated identically to NKS. In particular, total
hours are identical (in steady state) for NK and NKS. Column (5), FixH, presents results for
the case where we suppress variation of hours by adopting preferences that yield inelastic labour
supply (while allowing flexible Nash-bargained wages). Column (6) RigidW presents results for
the case where wage rigidity is imposed (while allowing variation in hours per worker). Column
(7), FixWH, presents results for the case where variation in hours is suppressed and wage rigidity
imposed. This last model corresponds most closely to the set up favoured by Shimer (2005), Hall
(2005), Krause and Lubik (2006). For a given column in Table (2), the entry in the row labelled
output indicates the variability of output in column X (6=Data) relative to the variability of
output in the US Data. The other entries in column X (except the final 3) correspond to the
variability relative to that of output generated by model X. The adoption of identical parameter-
isation of the driving processes facilitates comparison across diﬀerent models, as well as allowing
comparison within models across variables. The Final three entries in each column are simple
correlation statistics for labour market variables.
Table (2) here.
4.2.1 Comparison of Data, Frictional and Walrasian Models
ConsiderNKS,NK and Data columns of Table (2). NKS outperformsNK along several dimen-
sions in matching the moments in Data. First, given σZ , it generates greater output variability
than NK while capturing the relative variability of consumption and investment. Second NKS
does a better job of capturing the variability of inflation thanNK - where the reliance on variation
in hours, and the direct link between hours, wages, and marginal costs, requires more extreme real
wage variation, a more immediate rise in marginal costs in response to shocks and a greater front
loading of inflation. Third, by decomposing labour input variation into changes along extensive
and intensive margins, NKS reduces the variability of hours compared with NK. For NKS, em-
ployment variability is close to that in US Data. Yet hours are more variable in NKS than in
11It incorporates habit persistence in consumption, capital accumulation with quadratic adjustment costs and
’hybrid’ Calvo-style price setting.
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US Data, as are real wages - a consequence of the flexible wage assumption in NKS. Fourth, NK
cannot begin to account for unemployment, gross job flows and the like. Unemployment, vacancies
and labour market tightness exhibit less variability in NKS than US Data. Yet while Shimer
(2005) finds that unemployment and vacancies generate only 10% of that observed in the data
in a labour market equilibrium model with flexible wages, the fraction of the variability that can
be generated in the fully articulated NKS macroeconomic model is around 30%. This suggests
that the unemployment - vacancy - labour market tightness puzzle identified by Shimer, while
important, is substantially less dramatic in a fully articulated macroeconomic model. These num-
bers are somewhat higher than Krause and Lubik (2006), which suggests that habit persistence
in consumption may augment employment variability - as Krause and Lubik omit this feature.12
Fifth, the variability of job flows is of similar magnitude to that in the data, although job creation
is overvolatile and job destruction is insuﬃciently volatile. Sixth, for the baseline parameterisation
of NKS the correlations of unemployment with vacancies, of job creation with job destruction and
of hours with employment have the same signs as in US Data, although none closely match the
magnitudes observed in the data: the correlations of unemployment with vacancies and of hours
with employment are too small while that of job creation with job destruction is too large.13
Overall, this evidence supports the prevalent view that inclusion of search, matching frictions
and job destruction into a New Keynesian framework improves performance over a basic New Key-
nesian model with a frictionless Walrasian labour market. It also highlights the value of embedding
labour market frictions in a more general macroeconomic framework. Firstly, with variation of
hours on the intensive margin the counterfactual implications of endogenous job destruction are
reversed; secondly the severity of the unemployment variability puzzle is reduced.
4.2.2 Comparison with Fixed Hours Worked Variant
The impulse responses for NKS show that firms use variation of hours to facilitate short-run
adjustment to shocks. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Shimer (2005), Den Haan et al. (1999),
Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2006) implicitly suppress variation of hours per worker, by
12Capital accumulation reduces the variability of (un)employment, vacancies & labour market tightness, Holt (2006).
13Labour market tightness, Θ =
V
U , so log deviation of tightness, unemployment, vacancies and the slope of the
Beveridge curve are related by the identity: σθˆ =
t
σ2uˆ + σ
2
vˆ − 2 · σuˆ · σvˆ · ρ (uˆ, vˆ) .
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excluding an intensive margin for labour input. Since the models in those papers diﬀer in many
ways from the one we study, we examine how suppressing variation in hours per worker alters the
business cycle moments fromthose obtained with the baseline NKS set up. To do this we create
a variant of NKS in which hours variation is suppressed, call this FixH. FixH approximates
complete suppression (omission) of hours variation by setting ψ = 100 - which corresponds to a
labour supply elasticity of 0.02. The variability of hours in FixH is zero to two decimal places.
Several results emerge from this experiment. First, suppressing variation in hours results in
increased variation on the extensive margin. With the variability of both employment and unem-
ployment rising compared to NKS, the inability to adjust costs by altering hours worked clearly
leads to greater use of the extensive margin. Note that employment displays higher variability
than in US Data, although unemployment is less variable than in US Data. The variability of
vacancies declines, relative to that in either NKS or US Data. This appears surprising, but also
arises in Krause and Lubik (2006), who impose the suppressed hours feature that we are examining
in this Section. Also labour market tightness remains at roughly the same value as in NKS, which
suggests that the reduction in the variability of vacancies oﬀsets the increase in the variability of
unemployment.
Secondly, a positively sloped Beveridge curve, and positive correlation of job creation with
job destruction result from suppressing variation in hours per worker (with endogenous job de-
struction). This is interesting. The Beveridge curve eﬀect is consistent with Shimer’s view of the
deleterious eﬀect of endogenous job destruction, but our experiment shows that the result appears
to be specific to an environment in which an intensive margin is omitted. Of course, hours per
worker exhibit substantial variation in US Data at business cycle frequencies so the unrealistic
positively sloped Beveridge curve arises only for an unreasonable simplification.
The positive correlation of job creation with job destruction once hours are suppressed hints
at the mechanism underlying the upward sloping Beveridge curve. Weexamine this mechanism
this in greater detail in Section (4.3). The (increased) variation in employment can arise either
through changes in the variability of job creation or that of job destruction, or both. Suppression
of hours variation raises the absolute variability of gross job flows, particularly for job destruction.
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However, as we discuss below, it is the correlation structure for job creation rather than job
destruction that is distorted most by the suppression of hours per worker.
Turning to other macroeconomic aggregates. Suppressing hours variation forces labour input
adjustment to occur on the extensive margin, yet this has little eﬀect on the variability of output,
as the increased variation in employment oﬀsets the decline in hours variation. Equally, while
labour market variables are aﬀected in important ways, the presence or absence of the intensive
margin has little eﬀect on the relative variabity of consumption or investment. Both labour market
tightness and elasticity of labour supply aﬀect the bargained wage in equation (12). The real wage
is less volatile in FixH than in NKS, but remains over three times more volatile than US Data.
There is little impact on inflation.14
4.2.3 Comparison with Wage Rigidity Variant
In both NKS and FixH the standard deviation of wages is too large, while the variability of
unemployment and vacancies is too small. Shimer, (2006), Hall (2005) and Krause and Lubik
(2006), show that wage rigidity can address these problems, and find that if job destruction is
endogenous then the Beveridge curve is upward sloping. These studies implicitly suppress variation
in hours per worker. Here we study the eﬀect of introducing wage rigidity into the NKS model
which allows hours per worker and job destruction to vary endogenously.
To study the eﬀect of wage rigidity, we assume that the wage is a weighted average of the pure
Nash-bargained wage (as derived above), and a wage norm. The wage norm chosen is W¯t =Wt−1
which is independent of idiosyncratic shocks and exhibits dynamics of its own. This follows
Krause and Lubik (2006). For a worker that is part of a match with idiosyncratic cost shock Xt,
idiosyncratic earnings are then
W (Xt)Ht
Pt
= αw
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
η
∙
(1− α)
h
AZt
µt
i 1
1−α
h
α
RKt /Pt
i α
1−α
Ht + F−Xtµt + κ
κUt
κVt
¸
+(1− η)
h
(1−e)1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
− κH (1−Ht)
1−ϕ
1−ϕ
1
Λt
i
.
⎤
⎥⎥⎦+ (1− α
w)
Wt−1Ht
Pt
,
where αw parameterises the degree of wage rigidity present. If αw is 0 then only aggregate factors
(the wage norm) aﬀects the present wage, whereas if αw = 1, then the wage norm plays no part
14Krause and Lubik (2006) show that marginal cost is less dependent on the real wage with labour market search
and than in a standard New Keynesian model with a frictionless Walrasian labour market. The analysis of FixH
shows that their insight extends to an environment in which bargaining occurs over both hours and wages.
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and the wage is purely determined by Nash bargaining as outlined in Section (2). In place of (12)
the aggregate earnings are written
WtHt
Pt
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
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¡
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(37)
Of the other equations that form part of the system governing the behaviour of the economy, the
only one that is modified by the presence of the (backward looking) wage norm is the separation
condition, (13), which becomes
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
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1
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i
+ (1− αw) Wt−1HtPt
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ = 0. (38)
Column (6) of Table (2) displays the results of this alternative to Nash wage bargaining under
the title RigidW, where we let αw = 0.005. First we examine whether variation in hours per
worker attenuates the variation in unemployment suﬃciently that wage rigidity ceases to ’solve’ the
unemployment - vacancy - tightness puzzle. In fact Table (2) shows that even when job destruc-
tion is endogenous and hours are variable, wage rigidity raises the variability of unemployment,
vacancies and labour market tightness compared with either NKS or FixH. Unemployment and
labour market tightness are around two thirds of the figure in US Data, while vacancies rise to
over half of that in Data. This rise in the variability of vacancies under wage rigidity appears
consistent with the mechanism identified and exploited by Shimer (2005), whereby with flexible
wages, wage variation absorbs most of the eﬀect of shocks and reduces the incentive for firms to
post vacancies.15
Next we ask whether the introduction of wage rigidity overturns the result that variation in
hours per worker generates a downward sloping Beveridge curve despite endogenous job destruc-
tion? Table (2) shows that not only is the downward sloping Beveridge curve preserved under
wage rigidity, but also that the negative correlation of unemployment with vacancies becomes
stronger (more consistent with US Data) than in NKS. The correlation of job creation with job
destruction in RigidW also remains negative and becomes a little weaker than NKS - and more
15Krause and Lubik (2006) report that the volatility of vacancies declines once wage rigidity is imposed.
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consistent with US Data. As we discuss below, the behaviour of job flows underlies the slope of
the Beveridge curve. Although wage rigidity appears to aﬀects the variability of job flows to the
same extent as FixH, it distorts the correlation structure much less than FixH because variation
in hours per worker is used to soak up some of the initial response to shocks.16
Now consider whether wage rigidity results in realistic variation in hours per worker despite the
availability of the intensive margin or instead overrestricts hours variation. First note that wage
variability is not eliminated in RigidW, but is closer to the figure in Data than either of NKS
or FixH. Lower variation in wages tends to limit the variability of hours. The variation in hours
in RigidW is also closer to Data than the overvolatile case, NKS, or the undervolatile FixH.
Thus, besides its desirable eﬀect on the volatility of unemployment and vacancies, imposing wage
rigidity in an NKS model, with labour supply elasticity of 0.5, generates realistic hours variation.
Although the variability of employment is the same under wage rigidity with variation in hours
per worker - RigidW - as with flexible wages and no variation in hours per worker - FixH -
the performance of other labour market variables is markedly diﬀerent. In RigidW firms can
use hours per worker to adjust to shocks, as in NKS, but in addition wage rigidity leads the
correlation of employment and hours takes the correct sign. This suggests that hours per worker
and employment act as complements in adjustment to shocks in a manner consistent with US
Data.
Finally, turning to other macroeconomic aggregates. We find that inflation exhibits the same
volatility in RigidW as in NKS and FixH. This extends - to a more general macroeconomic
environment - Krause and Lubik’s result on the irrelevance of real wage rigidity for inflation
dynamics. Output is about 7% higher in RigidW than in NKS and FixH. This reflects the
greater variability of labour input (on the extensive margin). Finally, the relative volatilities of
consumption and investment are unaﬀected by the treatment of wages.
16The increased labour input variation on the extensive margin has implications for the variability of gross job flows.
As with FixH, wage rigidity tends to raise the importance of job destruction relative to job creation as a means
of aﬀecting employment. This suggests that variation in job destruction (the elimination/preservation of existing
matches) is the cheaper of the two means of using the the extensive margin to adjust labour input.
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4.2.4 Comparison with Wage Rigidity - Fixed Hours Worked Variant
If wage rigidity is imposed - αw = 0.005 - and hours variation is suppressed - ψ = 100 (labour
supply elasticity is 0.02) - then we obtain the model variant in column (7) FixWH. This com-
bination comes closest to the set up employed by Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Krause and Lubik
(2005) when discussing the impact of wage rigidity. The relative volatilities are closest to those
obtained in FixH. For the correlation of unemployment with vacancies and for job creation with
job destruction, the impact of suppressing hours variation while imposing real wage rigidity lies
between the desirable eﬀects of RigidW and the undesirable consequences of FixH.
4.2.5 Section Summary
Our results suggest that the baseline NKS model does a reasonable job of matching the rela-
tive volatility of a number of macroeconomic variables, but generates insuﬃcient variability in
unemployment and vacancies. Low unemployment variability can be addressed to some extent by
decreasing the elasticity of labour supply to suppress variation in hours - FixH - but this results
in a decline in the variability of vacancies, and an upward sloping Beveridge curve. A preferable
approach is to impose real wage rigidity while allowing labour input to vary on both intensive and
extensive margins - RigidW. This comes closest to solving the unemployment-vacancies-tightness
puzzle, generates a downward sloping Beveridge curve with a plausible magnitude (despite en-
dogenous job destruction), captures the variation of hours at business cycle frequencies, and the
interaction of hours with employment but does not distort other macroeconomic aggregates.
4.3 Labour Market Cross-Correlations
In this section we study the cross correlation structure of job creation and job destruction with
each other, with unemployment and with inflation. We compare the behaviour in US Data,
NKS, FixH , and RigidW so as to shed light on the mechanism that determines the slope of the
Beveridge curve. This section also acts to unify two strands of the literature. When research is
directed towards the cyclical behaviour of job flows (and particularly job destruction) researchers
have studied the dynamic cross correlations that we consider here, Den Haan et al. (1999), Trigari
(2005), Walsh (2005), do not consider the cyclical properties unemployment - vacancies - tight-
27
Whither Job Destruction?
Unemployment, Job Flows and Hours in a New Keynesian Model.
ness. Yet when the main research questions concern the properties of unemployment, vacancies
and tightness it is common to ignore the dynamic correlation structure of job flows or suppress en-
dogenous job destruction altogether, Hall (2005), Shimer (2005), Krause and Lubik (2006). This
is unfortunate because these issues are related. The cross-correlations are illustrated in Figure
(2).17
Figure (2) here
First we consider the properties of the baseline model NKS in relation to US Data. Panel
(a) of Figure (2) shows the correlation of leads and lags of job creation with contemporaneous job
destruction. For instance, in US Data, leads of job creation are positively correlated with current
job destruction but negatively correlated with contemporaneous and lagged job destruction. This
suggests that job creation is above average in advance of a spike in job destruction. From panel (c)
since job destruction is positively correlated with unemployment in USData (high during and after
a recession), job creation is high in advance of a recession - panel (b). NKS seems to capture the
broad features of the data. It captures various phenomena such as (i) positive correlation between
leads of job creation and unemployment while lags are negatively correlated with unemployment;
(ii) the positive correlation of current and lagged job destruction with unemployment; (iii) the
relatively weak relationship between inflation and gross job flows and (iv) the sign, if not the
magnitude of the dynamic cross correlations of inflation and unemployment. The cross correlations
for NKS frequently display the same sign as that in US Data. However, in panel (a) much of the
’action’ in the correlation structure for NKS arises around the contemporaneous cross-correlation
- as the overstrong contemporanseous correlation of job creation and job destruction is oﬀset by
overly weak correlations between lags of job correlation and job destruction. Such discrepancies
between NKS responses and US Data reflect the lack of persistence of the job creation and job
destruction responses revealed in the impulse responses in Figure (1). Evidence of this rebound
eﬀect is also present in the relationship between job flows and other variables where much more of
the movement in the correlograms occurs around the contemporaneous correaltion for NKS than
for US Data.
17FixWH is omitted for clarity as its dynamic cross-correlation structure is so similar to that of FixH.
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Next, we consider how diﬀerences in the margins for adjustment and in wage rigidity across
model variants aﬀect the correlation structure of gross job flows and how this is related to unem-
ployment and vacancy dynamics. From a simple accounting viewpoint, a rise in unemployment
can be achieved either through a rise in job destruction and a fall in job creation, or by one of
these in isolation with no change in the other, by a fall in job creation combined with a smaller fall
in job destruction or by a rise in job creation combined with a larger rise in job destruction. The
first of these would tend to give rise to a negative contemporaneous correlation of job creation and
job destruction, while the last (two) of these would tend to produce a positive contemporaneous
correlation of job creation with job destruction. Figure (2) and Table (2) reveal that the first of
these is what occurs in US Data, and in NKS and RigidW, whereas the last of these options
captures what occurs in FixH without variation in hours.
Why does this happen? Suppressing the variation of hours increases labour input variation on
the extensive margin, raising the variability of job destruction Table (2). Figure (2) panel (c)
shows that this does not alter the correlation structure of job destruction with unemployment or
inflation (relative to that in NKS). But the volatile response of job destruction obtained when
suppressing hours variation can only be sustained if there is an increase in job creation prior
to, contemporaneously with and following a rise in unemployment - in contrast to US Data.
So in FixH job creation rises before, during and after a recession, and job creation and job
destruction appear (weakly) positively correlated. While changes in job creation are not equal
to changes in vacancies, the two are related, and the positive correlation between job creation
and unemployment is suﬃcient to overturn the normally negative correlation of unemployment
with vacancies found in US Data, and in NKS and RigidW. This unfortunate feature of the
relationship between job creation and unemployment for FixH is also replicated in the correlation
of job creation with inflation, and is exacerbated by the fact that the contemporaneous association
between unemployment and inflation is itself too strong in the model.
Turning to the case of wage rigidity. Table (2) indicates that real wage rigidity (RigidW)
also generates a rise in the variability of employment and job destruction. However, Figure (2)
shows that this does not distort the behaviour of job flows (especially job creation) in the manner
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observed for FixH - so that the correlation structure of job creation with job destruction is closer
to that in the data. The opportunity to vary hours per worker in response to shocks in the face
of comparatively smooth wage variation produces a smoother dynamic correlation structure that
is as close or closer to US Data than obtained for either NKS or FixH. A minor exception
to this is the relationship between job destruction and unemployment. Here the instantaneous
correlation is similar to that in US Data, NKS and FixH while lagged job destruction is less
strongly positively correlated with unemployment than is the case for NKS and FixH.
Section Summary Detailed examination of the dynamic cross correlations lends some support
to the NKS model with flexible wages, but provides stronger support for the version with wage
rigidity, RigidW, which matches key features of US Data more closely. It also suggests that
models which lack an intensive margin (FixH, FixWH and many papers in the literature) are
misspecified owing to the consequences of an overreliance on the extensive margin for adjustment
of labour input.
4.4 Robustness Issues
Next we examine whether the results we have obtained are robust to variation in key parameters.
The results discussed so far favour the RigidW variant over the baseline NKS model, and both of
these to FixH - without variation in hours per worker. Since our results are obtained for particular
combinations of wage rigidity and labour supply elasticity, and since a range of parameterisations
could be supported by diﬀerent empirical studies, we consider two issues. First, whether the
desirable properties arising under rigid wage (RigidW) are sensitive to the parameterisation of
wage rigidity. Second, whether the desirable results arising with mildly elastic labour supply are
robust to other values of labour supply elasticity.
4.4.1 How much wage rigidity?
The degree of wage rigidity is captured by the parameter αw, which was assumed to take a value
on the unit interval - with αw close to 0 representing relatively rigid wages. In the absence
of any compelling evidence on its value, and to highlight the contrast with NKS, it was set
at αw = 0.005, so that the backward looking component of wages contributes 99.5% to wage
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dynamics. We examine the sensitivity of the variables in Table (2) to wage rigidity, by allowing
αw to take values on the interval [0.005, 1]. Here 0.005 corresponds to almost complete wage
rigidity (RigidW above) and αw = 1 corresponds to flexible wages in the baseline NKS model.
Figure (3) here.
Figure (3) illustrates the results. Panel (d) displays instantaneous correlation for unemploy-
ment with vacancies (the Beveridge curve), job creation with job destruction, and employment
with hours. For most values of αw, these statistics take on plausible values (of the expected sign
and magnitude) close to those in US Data. Only with little wage rigidity (αw > 0.9)- in the
neighbourhood of the NKS calibration - do these statistics take on less realistic values, with the
hours-employment correlation tending to zero and the the correlation of unemployment with va-
cancies becoming smaller than that of job creation with job destruction. Panel (c) captures the
relative variability of employment, hours and wages. Of these, unsurprisingly, the wage is the most
sensitive to the degree of wage rigidity. A less rigid wage (higher αw) is a more variable wage.
However, no value of αw allows wage variability to fall to the values in the data.18 Employment
variability is less sensitive to αw but is also somewhat too high relative to US Data. Panel (b)
captures the relative volatilities of unemployment, vacancies, job creation and job destruction.
Unemployment and vacancies are closest to the values attained in US Data when αw = 0.005, as
in RigidW, while job destruction is then too high and job creation is too low. At intermediate
values of wage rigidity (0.005 < αw < 0.9) job destruction remains too high and job creation too
low, while unemployment and vacancies decline to the levels observed in NKS. Panel (a) confirms
that the volatility of inflation relative to output is not sensitive to the degree of wage rigidity as
captured by αw.
So from Figure (3) it appears that of the desirable properties arising in RigidW, all except the
volatility of unemployment and vacancies are robust to the introduction of substantial amounts of
wage flexibility. This evidence is broadly supportive of the RigidW calibration.
18Perhaps an alternative, more backward-looking wage norm would help in this regard.
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4.4.2 Labour Supply Elasticity
Both RigidW and the baseline NKS model are calibrated to a labour supply elasticity of 0.5
(corresponding to ψ = 4).19 This figure can be justified from microeconometric evidence Domeij
and Floden (2005). Alternatives in the range [0, 1] have been used elsewhere Blundell and Mc-
Curdy (1999). It is lower than the unit-elastic specification adopted in Andolfatto’s (1995) real
business cycle model that incorporates labour market search with hours variation (with exogenous
job destruction), and also in standard New Keynesian models without labour market frictions
Woodford (2003). However, this choice is not uncontroversial. A labour supply elasticity of 0
is implicit in studies in the labour market search literature that omit the intensive margin for
adjusting labour input. In Figure (4) we examine the sensitivity of the model with rigid wages -
RigidW - to variation in labour supply elasticity.
The previous arguments in this section point to the importance of wage rigidity and endogenous
job destruction as key assumptions driving empirically plausible results in Tables (2), which shows
that inelastic labour supply generates the absence of hours variation akin to that found in models
without an extensive margin, and that it leads key correlations to take the magnitudes and even
signs inconsistent with US Data. A key question then is how rapidly these undesired properties
set in as labour supply becomes less elastic, or equivalently how robust are the desirable properties
of RigidW to labour supply elasticity?
We consider values of H ∈ [0.02, 1] in order to be able to incorporate the model variants
RigidW and FixWH. The results are contained in Figure(4). Panel (d) shows that the slope
of the Beveridge curve, the correlation of job creation with job destruction and the correlation of
hours with employment are close to the values observed in US Data for a wide variety of labour
supply elasticities (at least for H ∈ [0.1, 1] ). Only for very inelastic labour supply do these values
become implausible, and at such values hours exhibit much less variation than is present in US
Data.20 Panels (a) and (c) show that employment, wages and inflation are insensitive to the
elasticity of labour supply. Panel (b) shows that job destruction is too volatile.
19Labour supply elasticity, H , is
1
ψ
k
1−H
H
l
= 2ψ . In the limit as ψ → ∞, H → 0, and variation in hours is
eliminated.
20In the neighbourhood of unit elastic labour supply paramerisations the slope of the Beveridge curve and the
correlation of job creation and destruction become too small.
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In summary, the desirable properties of RigidW appear robust to a wide range of plausi-
ble labour supply elasticities, but model performance deteriorates if labour supply is suﬃciently
inelastic to eliminate variation in hours - as in FixWH.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that one simple modification - the introduction of an intensive margin for
labour input (ie variable hours) - allows a New Keynesian model with labour market search to
capture the properties of job flows and of unemployment and vacancies - both volatilities and
correlations. Modelling both aspects of labour market behaviour simultaneously has until now
been infeasible. At the same time this modification allows us to capture salient features of the
cyclical properties of hours.
To introduce hours, we adopt the dynamic general equilibrium discipline imposed by a New
Keynesian model. This explicit macroeconomic setting seems to be an appropriate environment
for the evaluation of labour market phenomena at business cycle frequencies. Indeed the New
Keynesian framework appears to ameliorate the unemployment and vacancy volatility problem
uncovered by Shimer (2005), since the standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are
around one third of that in US data under the baseline NKS model not the one tenth found by
Shimer in the context of a labour market equilibrium model. Nonetheless, Shimer’s result on wage
rigidity holds: wage rigidity raises the volatility of unemployment and vacancies. In the RigidW
set up (with wage rigidity) it is possible to account for half of the variability of unemployment
and vacancies present in the data. The introduction of variable hours has an additional payoﬀ
here. If the intensive margin is suppressed, FixWH, then wage rigidity tends to generate volatile
unemployment but suppresses the volatility of vacancies as in Krause and Lubik (2006), whereas
with the intensive margin, the variability of vacancies is almost as large as that of unemployment
- true to the data.
The desirable properties obtained under real wage rigidity, with an intensive margin and en-
dogenous job destruction are robust across a wide range of labour supply elasticities. This is
useful, since there seems to be controversy over the appropriate value of this. However, the results
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are not robust to extremely inelastic labour supply which (unrealistically) suppresses hours - a
short cut implicit in much of the literature on labour market search. In addition, except for the
variability of unemployment and of vacancies, the desirable properties are robust to a substantial
amount of wage flexibility.
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6 Appendix A: Calibration & Model Solution Method
6.1 Labour Market Flows
We specify the following labour market parameters ρ, ρx, σX , N , κV , e and γ. We use this
information to compute F
¡
X¯
¢
, X¯, F , U/N , V/N , JC, JD, M.
Following Den Haan et al. (2000) we assume that 10% of employment relationships separate
each quarter: ρ = 0.1.
In steady state the probability of separation, ρ, can be written as ρ = ρx+(1− ρx)
¡
1− F
¡
X¯
¢¢
.
Following Den Haan et al. (2000), let the probability of exogenous separation, ρx = 0.068. So the
probability of endogenous separation is 1 − F
¡
X¯
¢
= (ρ− ρx) / (1− ρx) = 0.034. To compute X¯
and F , we assume that X is lognormally distributed (µX , σX). We normalise µX = 1. There is
little empirical evidence to guide the choice of σX . Den Haan et al. (2000) and Walsh (2005) set
σX = 0.1 and 0.12 respectively; but X enters multiplicatively in their models, and in NKS this
would generate too much variability in labour flows data. we set σX = 0.05 to match the variability
of labour market flows data. Then, in steady state, the threshold value of the idiosyncratic cost
shock is X¯ = F−1 (0.034) = 1.09. The elasticity X¯ = 1.57. I set F to equal the average cost
shock for those matches that produce in steady state, F = E[X|X<X¯]
F(X¯)
= 0.997, so that the cost
shock does not impact on steady state wholesale production.
We also set N = 0.8, lower than Den Haan et al. (2000) (0.94) close to Trigari (2005) (0.75) and
higher than Andolfatto (1995) (0.54). From equation (15) the ratio of searchers to employment
U/N is UN =
1
N − (1− ρ) . Therefore the ratio of workers searching for jobs to employed workers,
U/N , is 0.35. In steady state, the employment evolution equation (17) can be written as, ρ = MN ,
while from (18): κV = MV . We set κ
V = 0.7, as in Den Haan et al. (2000). Therefore VN =
ρ
κV =
1
7 .
In steady state, the job creation and job destruction rates are equal, so JC = JD = ρ−ρxκV =
0.052, consistent with Den Haan et al. (2000).
The steady state condition for the employment evolution equation (17) is
ρ =M
µ
eU
N
¶γ µV
N
¶1−γ
.
We set the parameter γ in the matching function at 0.6, in the light of Petrongolo and Pissarides
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survey of empirical results and e = 0.5H. Then M = 1.001.
6.2 Preferences
The preferences of the representative household are characterised by the parameters β, ψ, H, ξ,
κC , C, φ, Λ and κH . The final two are computed from the steady state of the system.
We set the discount factor β = 0.989, in line with the literature. Let us assume that a worker
has a unit time endowment and in steady state spends a third of her time working: H = 1/3.
For the preferences specified, the elasticity of hours per worker, H , is 1ψ
£
1−H
H
¤
. Estimates of
this elasticity vary with gender and other variables, but is typically less than unity. We take the
value ψ = 4 as a baseline, which gives H = 0.5. The elasticity, ξ, of demand for real money
balances with respect to the marginal utility of consumption is set at 1. In line with Christiano
et al. (2005), we set the curvature parameter for the instantaneous utility function, φ = 1, and
κC = 0.5. We also normalise the steady state value of the aggregate consumption index to C = 1,
then from the steady state version of (27), Λ = 1−βκC
((1−κC)C)φ
= 1.011. Computation of κH will be
discussed below.
6.3 Capital Accumulation
The rate of depreciation, δ, is set at the satndard value of 0.025. In the baseline parameterisation
adjustment costs are set to χ = 12. In steady state, from the capital accumulation equation (25),
we that I/K = δ. From the steady state of equation (29) Q = Λ. In steady state, the capital euler
equation (30) determines the real rental rate on capital as RK/P = β−1 − (1− δ) ' 0.036.
6.4 Price Rigidity & Price Setting
Calibration of nominal rigidities in price setting by retailers involves specification of ω, τ and ε.
The extent of nominal rigidity in the goods market is determined by ω, which captures the
fraction of final goods firms in any period that do not adjust their price and τ which refers
to the fraction of final goods firms which set prices in a backward-looking manner. Empirical
evidence from studies using aggregate data suggests that prices last for 9-12 months on average
corresponding to ω ∈ [2/3, 3/4]. We take ω = 3/4 as a baseline value. Following Gali and Gertler’s
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estimates we set τ = 0.5.
In steady state the markup is µ = ε(ε−1) . We assume that, ε, the elasticity of demand equals
6, so µ = 1.2.
6.5 Production, Bargaining and Equilibrium
Next we set ρZ , ρυ, α and η. Then using (7), (12), (13), (25) (34), (35) and (36) we compute κ,
κH , A, K, W/P Y and C/Y.
Following Cooley and Quadrini (1999), the money supply growth process is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process with the autoregressive parameter ρυ = 0.49, with mean zero normally distributed
innovations with standard deviation συ = 0.006, while aggregate productivity also follows an
AR(1) process, with ρZ = 0.95. We normalise the steady state value of Z to unity. The standard
deviation of productivity is chosen in order to match the standard deviation of US quarterly HP-
detrended GDP data. Let us set the elasticity of output with respect to capital, α = 1/3, and
worker bargaining power (and share of the match surplus) η = 0.6.
K = (1− ρx)F
¡
X¯
¢
N
∙
αA
µRK/P
¸ 1
1−α
H. (39)
Combining (25), (35) and (36) with the definition of the auxilliary price index, P˜ , and the
capital market equilibrium condition we have the steady state condition
Y = C + δK =
Ã
P˜
P
!ε h
A
£
(1− ρx)F
¡
X¯
¢
NH
¤1−α
Kα − κµV
i
(40)
This can be combined with (39) to give
A
1
1−α =
C + κµV
³
P˜
P
´ε
³
α
µRK/P
´ 1
1−α
h³
P˜
P
´ε
µRK
αP − δ
i
(1− ρx)F
¡
X¯
¢
NH
. (41)
The steady state versions of (12) and (7) combined with (2) are
κ
κV
= β (1− ρx)
"
F
¡
X¯
¢ " κ
κV
+ (1− α)
µ
A
µ
¶ 1
1−α
µ
α
RK/P
¶ α
1−α
H
#
− WH
P
#
(42)
WH
P
=
"
η
"
(1− α)
µ
A
µ
¶ 1
1−α
µ
α
RK/P
¶ α
1−α
H + κ
V
U
#
− (1− η)
Λ
"
(1− e)1−ψ
1− ψ − κH
(1−H)1−ψ
1− ψ
##
(43)
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Combining (42) and (43) to eliminate WHP
κ
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1
κV −
β(1−ρx)F(X¯)
κV
+ηβ (1− ρx)F
¡
X¯
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ = (1− η)β (1− ρ
x)F
¡
X¯
¢⎡⎢⎢⎣ (1− α)
³
A
µ
´ 1
1−α
³
α
RK/P
´ α
1−α
H
− 1Λ
h
(1−e)1−ψ
1−ψ − κH
(1−H)1−ψ
1−ψ
i
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (44)
Combining (41) and the steady state version of (13) to eliminate A gives
1− η
Λ
"
(1− e)1−ψ
1− ψ − κH
(1−H)1−ψ
1− ψ
#
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
ηκVU −
κ
κV − (1− η)
F−X¯
µ
− (1− η) (1− α)
C+κµV

P˜
P
ε
k
P˜
P
ε µRK
αP −δ
l
(1−ρx)F(X¯)N
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (45)
Next, substituting (41) and (45) in (44), to elinate A and κH and gives the following expression
for κ in terms of known parameters:
κ = −β (1− ρx)F
¡
X¯
¢
(1− η)
µF − X¯
µ
¶
κV = 0.025 (46)
Combining this value for κ with (45) determines κH = 1.400. Then using (43) W/P = 2.881.
Finally, substituting for κ in (41) A = 1.745, from (39) K = 8.692 and from (40) Y = 1.217. It
follows that C/Y = 0.821.
6.6 Model Solution Method
The log-linearsied approximation to the system of equations, (2), (7) and (11) - (36), is stacked in
the form
AEt [Yt+1] = B · Yt + C · Zt
Where Zt is a vector of exogenous state variables (zˆt and υˆt) and Yt is a vector of endogenous jump
(yˆt, cˆt, ıˆt, hˆt, uˆt, vˆt, jˆct, jˆdt, pˆt, wˆt, µˆt, πˆt, rˆ
n
t , rˆ
K
t , mˆt, qˆt, κˆ
V
t , xˆt, λˆt) and state (kˆt, nˆt, cˆt−1, πˆt−1,
mˆt−1, pˆt−1) variables, and A, B and C are conformable matrices of coeﬃcients.21 The system is
solved with MATLAB, 7.0.1, using McCallum’s (1998) undetermined coeﬃcients approach based
on Klein’s (1997) generalised Schur decomposition method.
21The full system, Yt, includes a definition of the inflation rate in terms of the price index (πˆt = pˆt − pˆt−1))
updating equations for cˆt−1, πˆt−1, mˆt−1 and pˆt−1, and additional auxilliary variables including labour market
tightness θˆt = vˆt − uˆt , real wages, output per worker.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
ρ 0.1 γ 0.6 ω 0.75
ρx 0.068 β 0.989 τ 0.5
σX 0.05 φ 1 ε 6
N 0.8 κC 0.5 α 0.3
κV 0.143 C 1 η 0.6
e 0.165 ξ 1 ρZ 0.95
H 0.333 χ 12 ρυ 0.49
ψ 4 δ 0.025 συ 0.006
Table 1: Calibration: Assigned Parameters
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Standard
Deviation
w.r.t. GDP
or Correlation
Data NKS NK FixH RigidW FixWH
Output 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.07 1.02
Investment 2.81 2.79 2.87 2.86 2.82 2.85
Consumption 0.81 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65
Inflation 0.22 0.31 0.48 0.28 0.29 0.27
Wage 0.41 2.19 5.18 1.53 1.38 1.19
Hours per worker 0.57 0.65 1.19 - 0.46 -
Employment 0.68 0.88 - 1.13 1.13 1.20
Unemployment 7.50 2.62 - 4.22 5.79 4.20
Vacancies 8.36 2.83 - 1.07 3.64 1.36
Job Creation 5.29 6.37 - 6.30 4.01 6.00
Job Destruction 9.32 8.02 - 20.9 22.02 21.21
Tightness 15.49 4.47 - 4.19 8.90 4.92
Unemployment -
Vacancies
-0.94 -0.33 - 0.68 -0.77 -0.40
Job Creation -
Job Destruction
-0.41 -0.63 - 0.05 -0.50 -0.15
Hours -
Employment
0.43 0.05 - 0.04 0.73 -0.36
Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics
All statistics computed from HP detrended series, smoothing parameter 1600.
All model statistics are averaged across 100 simulations. Data : 1972:2 - 1993:4.
NKS NKS : New Keynesian model with labour market search and variable hours per worker. NK : New
Keynesian model with frictionless hours in Walrasian labour market. FixH : NKS with fixed hours per worker.
RigidW : NKS with wage rigidity. FixWH : NKS with wage rigidity and fixed hours per worker.
.
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Figure 1: NKS Impulse Responses for Money Growth and Productivity
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Figure 3: Impact of Wage Rigidity
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Figure 4: Role of Labour Supply Elasticity under Wage Rigidity and Endogenous Job Destruction.
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